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HOW TO RESCUE THE EURO:
TEN COMMANDMENTS
HANS-WERNER SINN*
There is no simple solution to the euro crisis, so expect
just more muddling through. The peripheral countries
are too expensive and should strive to become cheap-
er, but they will only do so if the flow of public funds
gradually dries up, not if the EFSF is expanded.
The Economist argued in its editorial column on
17 September that the real cause of the crisis-stricken
countries of the eurozone is a lack of credibility, that
these countries need fiscal stimulus to grow out of
their problems, and that voluminous rescue programs
are needed to create a firewall around Europe’s sol-
vent governments (Economist 2011). Unfortunately,
both the diagnosis and the recipes are wrong. 
Why The Economist is wrong
The truth is that the cheap flow of credit for private
and public purposes made possible by the euro until
2007 had fed an inflationary bubble that pushed
prices for property, government bonds, goods and
labour above the market clearing level and resulted
in huge current account deficits and foreign debt
levels that private investors have not been willing to
finance and refinance since 2008. The eurozone suf-
fers from a severe balance of payment crisis of the
kind that ended the Bretton Woods system. Instead
of merely lacking credibility, the stricken eco  -
nomies have lost their competitiveness. Instead of
growing out of their problems, they need to shrink
out of them (in nominal terms, to reduce their
imports and boost their exports). And instead of a
firewall, what the excessive rescue funds will create
is a fire channel between the inflated countries and
those that are still solvent, drawing them into a
morass of debt.
It is surprising to see that The Economist does not
even include the slightest hint regarding the problem
of wrong, bubble-driven prices and the correspond-
ing current account imbalances. It perceives the cri-
sis as a temporary confidence crisis, but overlooks its
deep structural roots. It focuses on a public debt
problem, while entire economies, public and private
sectors taken together, borrowed excessively from
other countries, taking advantage of the demise of
interest spreads once the euro was firmly announced.
The current account deficits that the four GIPS
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain)
accumulated from 2002, the year the euro was phys-
ically introduced, to 2010 amounted to 932 billion
euros, 7.0 percent of their joint GDP over that peri-
od. In the years 2005–2010, Greece’s average current
account deficit was 11.7 percent, Portugal’s 10.8 per-
cent, Spain’s 7.6 percent, and Ireland’s 3.7 percent of
GDP. By the end of last year, the average net foreign
debt position of the GIPS countries was 90.4 percent
of GDP (95.3 percent for Greece, 90.9 percent for
Ireland, 107.4 percent for Portugal and 86.6 percent
for Spain). While the Portuguese and Greek debts
resulted from government actions, the Irish and
Spanish debt originated primarily from private bor-
rowing, mainly in the construction sector. But that
difference is irrelevant. In the end it does not matter
whether the inflationary growth process originated
with the government or the private sector. The cheap
flow of credit unleashed by the euro pushed the
prices in all four economies above their long-run
equilibrium levels.
The balance of payment crisis
The bubbles that had built up in the GIPS countries
burst when the American financial crisis deprived
Europe’s banks of substantial parts of their equity,
forcing them to deleverage, and changed the mar-
ket’s risk perceptions. Private investors began to
doubt whether the current account deficits were sus-
tainable, balked at sending more funds to finance
them and fled from those countries in order to safe-
guard their wealth. A balance of payment crisis
erupted. 
* Ifo Institute. The earlier version of this article was published by
VoxEU.org on 3 October 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/index.
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In that situation, prices and wages should have fallen
to reduce the current accounts and attract new capital
from abroad. But that did not happen in most coun-
tries. Goods prices and wages got stuck at a level far
above the equilibrium, cementing the current account
deficits. From 1995, when interest rates started to con-
verge in anticipation of the euro, to the crisis year
2008, the average price level of the GIPS countries
increased by 23 percent relative to their trading part-
ners in the rest of the eurozone. After the outbreak of
the crisis, only Ireland underwent a sizeable real
depreciation of about 12 percent, which is likely to
result in a current account surplus this year, the first
in a decade. Portugal depreciated by a mere 1 percent,
and Spain and Greece did not depreciate at all. The
relative price level of Greece increased by the amount
of the VAT increase, while the level of net-of-tax
prices grew in line with Greece’s eurozone trading
partners. 
A reason for the failure to depreciate significantly can
be sought in the ECB’s explicit and implicit rescue
actions that began in the summer of 2007. This was
not just the much debated purchase of government
bonds, which by now amounts to 157 billion euros.
Much more important was the Target credit, a reallo-
cation of ECB refinancing credit from the core, basi-
cally Germany, to the periphery beyond the credit
necessary to endow these countries with a monetary
base for internal circulation.1 To be concrete: the
mechanics of the Eurosystem implied that the Bun  -
desbank gave credit to other euro countries at the
expense of German banks to the tune of 390 billion
euros (by August 2011) to allow them to crank up the
money-printing press to finance their balance of pay-
ment deficits.
It was like in the Bretton Woods system. At that time,
the United States had financed its current account
deficit by printing and lending more dollars than the
United States needed for internal purposes.2 The dol-
lars were flowing to, among other recipients, German
exporters who had them exchanged by the Bundes  -
bank for deutschmarks. The ‘dollar-deutschmarks’
crowded out the ‘refinancing-credit-deutschmarks’
stemming from the Bundesbank on a one-to-one
basis, which meant that there was a public capital
export from Germany to the United States via the
central bank systems. At the time, it was assumed
that the Bundesbank tolerated the process in order to
help finance the Vietnam war. While the Bundesbank
invested the dollars it received into US Treasury bills,
the Banque de France insisted that the US govern-
ment convert them to gold from Fort Knox. This
destroyed the Bretton Woods system in the period
1968–1971. Today the Bundesbank converts the
‘GIPS euros’ into ‘German euros’, which then crowd
out the ‘refinancing-credit-euros’ issued by the
Bundesbank, and instead of foreign currency or for-
eign assets, the Bundesbank just receives claims on
the Eurosystem that it will not be able to convert into
anything.
Before the outbreak of the crisis, the Target balances
were close to zero. But by June 2011 the four GIPS
countries had built up a Target debt of 327 billion
euros, while the Bundesbank’s Target claims amount-
ed to 337 billion euros in that same month. And the
fast pace of that type of credit is breath taking. In
August 2011 alone, the Bundesbank had to lend the
ECB 47 billion euros for a further shifting of the stock
of ECB credit to other euro countries.
In 2008, 2009 and 2010 no less than 88 percent of the
aggregate current account deficit (capital import) of
the four GIPS countries and 62 percent of Germany’s
current account surplus (capital export) was Target
credit. While the Target credit was important in all
four of the GIPS countries, there were substantial dif-
ferences among them. In the three years mentioned,
both Greece’s and Portugal’s current account deficits
were entirely financed by Target credit. In Ireland the
Target credit financed the entire current account
deficit and, in addition, a huge capital flight, to the
tune of 120 billion euros. By contrast, in Spain only
about a quarter of the 200-billion-euro current
account deficit was Target-financed.3
The credit provisions through the ECB system have
not been deliberate policies insofar as they were
endogenously induced by the GIPS countries’
demand for funds which private markets were no
longer willing to meet. However, the ECB has facili-
tated them through repeated lowering of the credit-
worthiness requirement for the collateral that banks
had to offer for their refinancing credit. In effect, this
was a rescue mechanism before the rescue mechanism. 
1 Cf. H.-W. Sinn and T. Wollmershäuser (2011), Sinn (2011a, 2011b
and 2011c) and Wolf (2011). See also the special issue of ifo
Schnelldienst (2011) with contributions of H.-W. Sinn, H. Schlesinger,
W. Kohler, C.B. Blankart, M.J.M. Neumann, P. Bernholz, T. Mayer
and J. Möbert and C. Weistroffer, G. Milbradt, S. Homburg, F.L. Sell
and B. Sauer, I. Sauer, J. Ulbrich and A. Lipponer, C. Fahrholz and
A. Freytag, U. Bindseil and P. Cour-Thimann and P. König, 
F.-C. Zeitler, K. Reeh. 
2 See Kohler (2011). 3 See Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011), Figure 14.CESifo Forum 4/2011 54
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Opening or closing the tap? 
The widely discussed open rescue mechanism being
set up since May 2010 just came as a relief force
helping the ECB to stem the tide, given that it was
running out of ammunition. The rescue operations
include the first package for Greece as well as the
further help coming from the EFSM, the EFSF and
the IMF, on the order of 332 billion euros. Together
with the Target help to the GIPS until June 2011
(327 billion) and the current stock of ECB govern-
ment bond purchases (157 billion), this amounts to
a total of 815 billion euros. With the expansion of
the EFSF to 780 billion euros decided on 21 July
2011, which will have to be ratified by the parlia-
ments this autumn, the total volume of the planned
and implicit rescue operations increases to 1.683 tril-
lion euros, as shown in Figure 1. This is a bit more
than half the 2011 public debt forecast for the GIPS
and Italy by the end of this year, which amounts to
3.35 trillion euros.
This is a huge sum, a multiple of what was on the
table on 8 and 9 May 2010, when the first pro-
grammes were hastily put together over a weekend. If
the GIPS countries go bust, Germany alone will be
liable for 469 billion euros, and France for 324 billion
euros. If, in addition, Italy defaults, the two countries
will incur a liability of 522 billion and 364 billion
euros respectively. If the liability materialises and is
covered by public debt, the debt-to-GDP ratios of
Germany and France would be 103 percent, in both
cases, taking the Eurostat 2011 debt predictions as a
basis. There can be little doubt that such sums would
undermine the creditworthiness of the eurozone as a
whole. What is called rescue programmes may, in
fact, turn out to be incendiary channels through
which the fire can expand and smother all public
budgets in the eurozone.
Markets have already reacted by charging substan-
tially higher premiums for credit default risks. The
insurance for ten-year German Bunds now costs
1.2 percent per year, ten times the price before the
crisis, and it has increased much faster than the
British rate, overtaking it in August 2011, probably
for the first time in history. While Britain has also
been hit by the crisis, except for a limited help for
Ireland, it has decided not to participate in the euro
rescue operations.
It is not only that France and Germany may already
have taken on more than they can bear. What is more,
the rescue measures perpetuate the current account
imbalances and slow down or prevent the necessary
process of real depreciation. After all, in countries
that are cut off from the capital markets, the flow of
rescue funds is identical to the current account
deficits. 
The rescue measures also destabilise markets inas-
much as they try to support asset prices above their
long-run equilibrium. This creates a permanent
downward risk that causes renewed jitters whenever
doubts arise regarding the depth of the rescuers’
pockets. This aspect, too, reminds of the times when
governments tried to maintain
inappropriate ex  change rates, or
used up their reserves to tem-
porarily stabilise them, causing
even larger disruptions when they
had to give up. A frightening sce-
nario is therefore that each new
flaring of the crisis will drain
more money from the creditors’
purses, until they run empty and
the euro collapses. As long as
public credit continues to flow,
the deficit countries can continue
to be financed, but when it stops
flowing, some of them may pre-
fer to leave the euro in order to
try to bring back their finances to
order through depreciation. Then
both the euro and the core coun-
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Given that this autumn public financing of the crisis
countries has gone into its fifth year, the view that
markets are merely dysfunctional and overstate the
problems seems not well founded, and neither does
the view that unlimited rescue funds should be pro-
vided to calm them. If stable countries like France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Finland or Austria are not
to become impoverished or the euro to collapse due to
growing foreign debt levels, it is necessary to gradual-
ly but steadily close the tap for new loans rather than
invent ever more channels and programmes to provide
liquidity to insolvent countries. 
If the tap is closed too quickly, this process could be
accompanied by severe real contractions, but if it is
sufficiently gentle, a mere real depreciation by cut-
ting wages and prices relative to the trading partners
in the eurozone will suffice to improve the current
accounts and reduce the level of external debt.
Germany before the crisis and Ireland after the crisis
have demonstrated that this, though painful, is pos-
sible in principle. 
European politicians argue that opening the tap and
imposing a political debt constraint under common
EU control, for example via the Euro Plus Pact, the
new six-pack of the Commission or even a fiscal gov-
ernment for the eurozone, would be a sensible solu-
tion. While this view looks plausible at first glance, it
seems to stem from the old days when markets were
willing to finance the debtor countries and mere polit-
ical debt constraints were necessary to discipline
them. This is not the situation today. Given that pri-
vate markets are no longer willing to finance the
afflicted countries, such debt constraints are not only
superfluous; they may even be counterproductive.
What is called political debt constraints will, in effect,
turn out to be entitlements to use the public debt
machinery set up within the EFSF and the Target sys-
tem. Europe does not need to place constraints on the
demand for public debt if the supply constraints the
creditor countries impose are sufficient. 
What the eurozone needs is a crisis resolution mecha-
nism, together with tighter constraints for the ECB
that stop the self-service mechanism currently prevail-
ing. It also needs to define how much help will be
available under what conditions. The mechanism has
to be specified before the respective funds for the new
European Stability Mechanism planned to start in
2013 or earlier are set up, for otherwise the creditors
will lose their bargaining chip. The ‘10 command-
ments’ formulated below would lead the eurozone out
of its crisis by gently tightening the budget con-
straints, turning it into a place where markets can bet-
ter perform their allocative function. 
Ten commandments for a renewed eurozone
The ‘commandments’ limit the scope for political ad-
hoc actions and specify a crisis procedure that is a
compromise between the goals of maintaining disci-
pline and preventing panic in the case of a crisis. They
balance out the need to help with the need to respect
the stability and solvency of the rescuing countries.
The crisis countries will themselves then be able to
decide whether they see a possibility of managing the
real depreciation process or whether they find the bur-
den too large and prefer exiting the eurozone. The
procedure gives them a fair chance and a safe option
if they are willing and able to find the necessary inter-
nal consensus. It does provide much more solidarity
than the Maastricht Treaty foresaw, without establish-
ing a self-service shop for debtors.
In detail, the following measures could be taken:
1. No government bond purchases
Further purchases of government bonds by the euro
rescue fund EFSF and the ECB are prohibited. Only
assistance programmes that count on the participa-
tion of the IMF are allowed. Eurobonds are ruled out
permanently. Even in a putative United States of
Europe there is no place for them. Both the United
States and Switzerland, two decentralized fiscal sys-
tems that originated through a long trial and error
process, do not foresee this kind of help.
2. Paying back the Target credit
The credit given by the Bundesbank (Target) to the
GIPS is not to increase further. The Target balances
are to be settled once yearly with marketable assets
bearing market interest rates, as is the case in the
United States. Transition rules for the existing bal-
ances could be agreed upon. 
3. New voting rights in the ECB
Voting rights in the ECB Council should be weighted
by ECB capital shares. 
4. Unanimity for credit policies
The ECB Council is to require unanimity and the
approval of the creditor countries’ governments for
any inter-country credit transfers that it tolerates or
induces. CESifo Forum 4/2011 56
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5. Liquidity help for two years
The EFSF is to concentrate on liquidity assistance for
crisis countries and limit such assistance to two years. 
6. Slicing the problem in the case of impending insolvency
If a euro country cannot service its debts after the two
years, an impending insolvency instead of a mere illiq-
uidity is to be presumed. In such a case, and under
exclusion of the cross-default rules, an automatic
haircut is to be applied to the maturing bonds, and
only to them. The depreciated old debt is to be
replaced by new sovereign bonds guaranteed up to
80 percent by the EFSF, limiting such guarantees to
30 percent of GDP.
7. Full insolvency and exit for non-performers
A country whose guarantees are drawn or that
exceeds the guarantee limit must declare insolvency.
The country in question will be granted a haircut on
its entire sovereign debt and it must leave the euro-
zone.
8. Basel IV: higher risk weights for government bonds
After the Basel III system for bank regulation, a
Basel IV system is needed in which the risk weights for
sovereign debt are to be raised from zero to the level
for mid-sized companies.
9. Higher equity ratios
Common equity (core capital plus balance-sheet
ratio) is to be increased by 50 percent with respect to
Basel III. 
10. Bank recapitalisation 
Weak banks unable to raise enough capital in the mar-
ket to fulfil these requirements are to be forced to
recapitalise and will be partly nationalised. The gov-
ernment is to sell its shares in them once the crisis has
been overcome. 
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